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and 
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University of Pittsburgh 
ABSTRACT 
Little attention has been given in policy analysis to the creative process of 
designing solutions to public policy problems. There are a number of 
difficulties in applying macro-level theories - whether from economics, 
sociology, philosophy or macro-systems theory - in the policy process. 
Any macro-level theory will tend to provide inadequate guidance in one 
or more of three aspects of policy-making: a model of causation, a model 
for evaluating alternatives and outcomes, and a model of how interven- 
tions operate. Our current knowledge about which policy strategies work 
best under which conditions is at best rudimentary. Academic disciplin- 
ary perspectives focus on a narrow repertoire of policy instruments. What 
is required is a design focus which draws on instruments associated with a 
range of disciplines and professions. A design perspective involves both a 
systematic process for generating basic strategies and a framework for 
comparing them. Such an approach will require at least the following 
elements: (i) the characteristics of problems (scale, collectiveness, 
certainty, predictability, independence); (2) characteristics of goals 
(value-laden, operational, process of goal-setting); (3) characteristics of 
instruments (suitability of different instruments). 
i. Introduction 
Governments have been in the business of making public policies for as 
long as they have existed, but frequently, or perhaps usually, they were 
making policy choices in areas about which they had very little real 
knowledge. Even in the now well-established policy areas such as educa- 
tion, crime, and international affairs there is little coherent theory for 
explaining how government could intervene in the most efficient and 
effective manner. This has resulted in policy-making by trial and error, or 
by analogy with other policies and programs, or simply by intuition. In 
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the literature on decision-making in organizations this form of decision- 
making has been characterized as the 'garbage can' model, where all 
inputs into the decision are thrown into the garbage can and the decision- 
makers decide which bits to retrieve as and when it suits them (Cohen, 
March and Olsen, I972). In such a decision-making environment the 
results of any round of choices are scarcely predictable. 
There are two major options for moving policy-making out of this 
garbage can; both require some more explicit attention to theory. One 
approach would be to employ social theory more explicitly in making 
public policies, and particularly to employ macro-level social theory as a 
guide for action. Policy analysis is, to some extent, applied social science 
(MacRae, I976) and as such could apply the theoretical approaches of the 
social sciences to solving social problems. The most familiar case of this is 
the utilization of Keynesian economics as a guide for national economic 
policy-making. It has been argued, for example, that what is needed for 
policy-makers in the waning portion of the Twentieth Century is a 
comprehensive theoretical approach to the problems which beset many 
industrialized nations; without such an understanding at a very 
fundamental level, policy-making is indeed muddling through 
(Benjamin, I983; Goodin, I982). This call for a new Weber/Marx/ 
Keynes for the emerging post-industrial world is intellectually appealing 
in many ways, as it would provide as (Benjamin points out) a par- 
simonious means of comprehending the world as well as a means of 
evaluating any proposed changes. As appealing as such an approach 
would be, we find a number of potential problems with the acceptance of 
such an approach as it might be applied through policy analysis, even 
leaving aside the normative implications of the social engineering which 
would be required by the approach and the more practical problem of 
locating the new Messiah. 
The alternative to a more comprehensive theoretical understanding of 
the social world within which policy analysis functions is a better 
understanding of policy-making and policy analysis. If we better under- 
stand the characteristics of policy itself, and the characteristics of the 
policy process, we may be able to intervene more effectively into the social 
world even without a Keynes or Marx to guide us. Thus, we will be 
arguing that policy and the policy process can and should be understood 
without agreement on a social paradigm. (Asinus asino, sui suspulcher.) 
Such an approach need not be the 'muddling through' of incremental- 
ism, as such an approach would have a firm theoretical base; that base 
would be in policy analysis itself rather than broader social or political 
theory. As such it can seek to provide answers to social questions without 
fully comprehending all the characteristics of the social process. This has 
risks (Goodin, I982, 2o-8) but so does waiting for the right social theory. 
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We will be adopting the perspective of policy analysis as a distinctive 
approach to social problems for several reasons. First, the 'emerging, 
post-industrial world' is one of great complexity, interdependence and 
indeterminacy. There will be a greater fusion of domestic and interna- 
tional polities and economies to the extent that national decision-makers 
will have less control over their own destinies. In addition, the increasing 
interdependence of policy areas and programs will mean that any 
intervention into one area may have significant consequences for many 
other policies and programs. This may be the very sort of world that may 
make the development and utilization of a comprehensive social theory 
approach difficult. This will be especially true if the type of theory 
envisioned is of a deductive and closely ordered nature (Alexander, I 965). 
Paradoxically, then, the complexity of the post-industrial world being 
described creates a great demand for a comprehensive theoretical under- 
standing of social processes at the same time that it may make such an 
approach less useful for policy-making, especially policy-making at a 
mundane, program level. Thus, what may be needed as much as a theory 
of the post-industrial world is a theory of policy design which allows the 
policy analyst to deal with the complexity of the world in a more 
intelligent and contingent fashion (Dryzek, I 983). 
2. Policy design 
The application of ideas from the design sciences to solving social 
problems first appeared in the planning literature. Architects and others 
in the applied disciplines connected with urban design turned their 
attention to the organizational problems of the modern city. The basic 
idea was to externalize the process of creating solutions to ensure both its 
rationality and manipulability. Techniques for quantifying this design 
process and adding computer assistance were incorporated from opera- 
tions research (which continues to play a controversial role in architec- 
tural design) and were coupled with an engineering perspective on 
problem solving. The most notable proponent of this approach to design 
has been Christopher Alexander (i 964; I 965). 
Not only could the process of designing be divorced from the thing 
designed, but it was no longer limited by the capacities of a single 
designer. Techniques to aid the design process could convert the designer 
from 'magician' working with intuition and insight to 'systems engineer' 
capable of decomposing a problem and systematically searching for an 
optimal set of possible solutions. These efforts to remove the individual 
designer's internal constraints and to widen the area of search drew the 
attention of Herbert Simon. His contribution to a design approach 
focused on the logic of the design process. He applied several of the 
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notions from his work in artificial intelligence to developing an algorithm 
for conducting problem-motivated design (1978). His emphasis on the 
hierarchical structure of problems and strategies for their decomposition 
linked the design focus to decision problems in the management science 
literature. 
Early writers from this group concerned with design include Ernest 
Alexander (I982) (no relation), who studied the inadequacies of the 
policy formulation process with the framework inspired by Simon. In the 
last few years several authors have applied the design theme to problems 
of policy formulation in the Federal government; these include Mosher 
(i 980), Salamon (i 98 I), Wolman (i 98 I) and Dryzek ( 983) . In each of 
these instances, the emphasis has been on systematizing the process of 
policy formulation to overcome both policy-makers' biases and the 
preferences of most analysts for ex post evaluation. 
As noted earlier, our attention to policy-making has been skewed in 
favor of evaluating the consequences rather than the origins of specific 
alternatives. While subsequent effort is devoted to analyzing data on a 
given problem, little systematic attention is given to fashioning the means 
of providing a solution. Those involved in actually developing alterna- 
tives within the policy area tend to put aside training in systematic 
analysis in favor of ajudgemental and intuitive approach. And with good 
reason, since little attention is given to design training in professional 
policy schools. 
Several recent texts in policy analysis (Quade, Dunn, Mood) attempt 
to summarize in several sections the design experience of professional 
analysts. However, these commentaries typically offer advice on what not 
to do and what pitfalls to avoid in applying one's intuitions, rather than 
offering even a conceptual framework for undertaking design tasks. We 
are left with two views of design: an interactive and creative process with 
few rules and guidelines, or a winnowing process of heavily constrained 
search governed by a concern for feasibility. In the former case, designing 
is idiosyncratic and chancy, while in the latter, it appears deterministic 
and inertial. The utilization of a macro-theory as the background to 
design would tend to push design towards the more deterministic 
approach. 
Even if we were not dealing with the complexity of the post-industrial 
world as outlined, however, there are a number of difficulties in the 
application of a macro-level theory in the policy process. As discussed by 
MacRae and Wilde (1979) policy-making requires: a definition of the 
problem, models and alternatives, criteria for the evaluation of alterna- 
tives, and an assessment of political feasibility. Stated another way, we 
will argue that to engage in policy-making one needs a model of causation, 
a model of evaluation and a model of interventions. 
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The model of causation allows the analyst to associate certain outcomes in 
the society with certain initial states; disease results from germs. There 
may be alternative models of causation - disease coming from an 
imbalance of humors in the body or from evil thoughts - and these 
alternative models may be associated with world outlooks such as 
Marxism. 
The model of evaluation allows the analyst to map the outcomes of the 
policy process, or the initial state of society, into a set of normative 
premises about policy and society. These premises may be very broad, 
e.g. justice, or they may be more policy specific, e.g. efficiency. 
Finally, the model of interventions guides the analyst in the selection of the 
locus and form of intervention into ongoing social and economic processes 
in order to produce a desired outcome. Thus, this would be a theory of at 
what stage government should intervene, and which of the tools in its 
toolkit (Hood, I984) it should select. 
We will argue that any macro-level theory will tend to provide very 
inadequate guidance in each of these three aspects of policy-making, and 
that again there is a need for a theory of policy design to aid in the 
formulation of policy, such a theory to contain within it guidance for 
understanding causes, evaluating outcomes, and guiding interventions. 
3. Politics in the postindustrial world 
Before returning to the fundamental problem discussed above, we should 
also point out the political difficulties which may be associated with the 
development of a more comprehensive vision of policy-making in the 
emerging post-industrial world. Two features of politics in the majority of 
industrial/post-industrial states would appear to make the utilization of a 
comprehensive approach to policy-making problematic. The first is the 
sectorization of policy-making. Whether the sectors are conceived of as 
'iron triangles', 'issue networks' or 'woolly corporatism' it is clear that 
most policies are now made in semi-autonomous sectors, each with its 
own sets of actors, issues, and concepts (Jordan, I98I). Although the 
problems with policy-making in this manner are well known (Habermas, 
I976, 62; Peters, I98I), there are also decided political advantages. In 
particular, fragmented political decision-making tends to be more con- 
sensual and depoliticized than decision-making in more open political 
arenas (Richardson, I982) and it keeps difficult decisions confined within 
a narrow framework of the 'journeymen of issues' (Heclo, 1978, i o6), who 
if they do not always agree on the solutions to problems certainly will 
agree on the problems. 
The second political feature of politics in the post-industrial world is 
somewhat related to the first. This is the increasing demands for partici- 
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pation in decision-making (Inglehart, 1977). Participation has come to be 
valued as an end in itself, as well as for its instrumental value in affecting 
the distribution of public resources. This in turn means that policy- 
making in post-industrial political systems tends to be by bargaining and 
negotiation rather than by imposition or control. It also means that 
policy-making in these systems will be rather untidy - perhaps the price 
which must be paid for high levels of democratic participation. 
Richardson (1 982) has combined two aspects of policy-making similar 
to these to describe what he calls 'policy styles' in Western democracies. 
The two dimensions he employs are an active-reactive dimension, and a 
bargaining versus imposition dimension. Although there are differences 
among the six countries discussed using this framework, and among 
policy areas within those countries, the general finding is that these 
societies all tend toward the consensual/reactive cell of the four-fold table. 
This is, therefore, diametrically opposed to the active/imposition ends of 
the dimensions which would be the logical place for the political utiliza- 
tion of a macro-level theoretical approach. Also, in at least one of the 
countries where a more radical policy approach has been successful 
previously, Sweden, Ruin (I982) finds that this form of policy-making is 
less acceptable. Thus, the political style of the post-industrial world may 
make the use of a macro-level theory for policy guidance less acceptable to 
members of the society, and to members of an increasing number of 
organized groups, who may have theories of their own. The utilization of a 
macro-level theory would tend to be extremely centralizing. This may be 
useful given the nature of some of the problems in the post-industrial 
world which have been outlined. It would, however, run counter to many 
of the decentralizing trends seen in contemporary politics and, as 
Benjamin (I980) has pointed out, decentralization may not be costless. 
As in most issues of importance, there is substantial disagreement with 
the characterization of government in the post-industrial world as being 
highly dependent upon its environment and upon agreement of the 
affected actors. Nordlinger (I982), for example, argues quite strenuously 
that the modern democratic state has substantial (and by implication) 
increased autonomy. He finds that these governments can indeed make 
decisions even when their policy conceptions diverge from those of the 
population. But even in this case the discussion appears to be more of a 
case-by-case exercise of authority rather than the imposition of a compre- 
hensive framework of action. Even in perhaps the most single-minded 
government in a democratic country in recent memory - Mrs Thatcher's 
Great Britain - there have been some notable U-turns (Keegan, I984). 
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4. Macro-theory and policy-making 
To return to the main line of argument, the shortcomings of applying a 
macro-level theory to the policy process might be illustrated best by 
briefly considering the well-known case of macro-economic theory. Put- 
ting aside for the moment the widespread disagreements over the 
appropriate premises of the theory, many of the problems connected with 
its policy relevance are a product of its scope - in a sense it is too macro a 
theory for generating policies with any precision. While aggregation has 
permitted theorists to explain the behavior of a complex economy by 
means of a few basic relationships and a small number of economic forces, 
it has also clouded the impact of policy interventions on economic actors 
and immersed policy development in guesswork. 
Aggregate indicators of economic performance, summarizing the 
behavior of prices, output and unemployment for example, serve as 
proxies for the outcomes of a variety of micro-level adjustment processes. 
Relying on these proxies as target variables for constructing and monitor- 
ing policy instruments requires more than a courageous ceteris paribus 
assumption; the known and unknown adjustment processes must behave 
in a uniform, reliable manner. When adjustments are not largely uniform 
in space and time, or when their performance is idiosyncratic, the 
information summarized by an aggregate indicator is seriously com- 
promised. This can bias policy targets, at times signalling the need for 
intervention where none exists, while hiding a genuine need when one 
arises. 
Much of the policy debate in the past few years has centered on 
stabilization policy, the use of various instruments to counteract short- 
term fluctuations in economic performance. Advocates of smoothing 
fluctuations in aggregate demand (Tobin, I 981 ) generally call on monet- 
ary and fiscal instruments; more recently, those concerned with disrup- 
tions in aggregate supply (Okun, I98I) have turned to incomes and 
manpower policies. The task of design in this context is not so much one of 
fashioning new instruments as of finding the plausible interventions. As 
generic policy strategies, the available instruments, taxing and spending 
for example, are highly institutionalized and are widely viewed as the 
most potent sources of potential, policy-induced changes in the economy. 
Despite their power, these instruments can rarely be wielded with any 
precision. 
On the one hand, design from a macro-theory warrants caution. 
Because the details of the micro-level adjustments in the economy are 
open to dispute we can expect lags of indeterminate duration in the 
responses of policy targets to any particular intervention. Furthermore, 
we cannot be certain about either the location or the magnitude of the 
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eventual effect of an intervention. Designing an instrument to have a 
precise effect of a given magnitude is practically impossible. Moreover, 
many of the available instruments work in an antagonistic fashion. Using 
one instrument to reach a selected policy target may actually move us 
farther away from other targets. Raising output toward full employment 
through an expansionary policy that applies fiscal instruments will 
disrupt the trade balance, for example. To keep both targets in line we 
need an additional instrument to reverse the negative effects of the first, 
and so on. As two noted theorists (Dornbusch and Fischer, i982) have 
noted, we normally require as many instruments as there are targets. 
Every time one instrument is used it spoils the balance achieved by 
another. If we design the right instruments, these displacements should 
diminish in size; otherwise the increasing interdependence of portions of 
the economy will mean that they will grow. 
On the other hand, design may be viewed as altogether ill-advised. 
Some theorists eschew these instruments, viewing the products of any 
design effort as typically too blunt and the prospects of success in using 
them as too remote. Theorists such as Sargent and Wallace (I 976) would 
prefer to rely on market forces to restore the level of equilibrium to the 
economy and view most policy instruments as an additional source, 
rather than cure, of disruptions. Those advocating interventions find the 
self-adjusting propensities of the economy too sluggish or largely ineffec- 
tual. Unfortunately, the resolution of these views must await a more 
extensive articulation of the behavioral foundations of the theory at a 
micro-level. If we fix our focus on the macro-level, we are left wondering 
whether to design at all; a curious implication for a macro-theory with 
such an elaborate scheme of causation. Unless the micro-level assump- 
tions were well-articulated the theory would have little hope in providing 
guidance for designing effective and efficient public policies. 
The experience with macro-policy theory in sociology has been little 
better. Attention to social processes has produced a rather elaborate set of 
causal propositions regarding institutional change and social develop- 
ment, but little in the way of refined policy instruments. The work of 
Weber and his followers concentrates primarily on the role of various 
background factors - Protestant ethic, leadership style, organizational 
climate - in accounting for the development and performance of social 
institutions. Changing these features, say to improve performance on 
some criterion, requires substantial leverage. In effect, one has to undo 
the result of an evolutionary process, overcoming built-in equilibriating 
and defense mechanisms, as well as neutralizing counterforces in the 
environment. Unlike macro-economics, macro-sociology has few tools 
available for reaching any given policy target; as a result, theory is as 
likely to support the shotgun or the sledgehammer as it is the scalpel 
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(Scott and Shore, I 979; Sieber, I 98 I). The approach of critical theorists in 
sociology supports this view. Remedying social problems, in their view, 
requires fundamental changes not only in social policies, but in the 
institutions and people that make them. The potential for error and the 
social costs of intervention on this scale are what frightened Popper (I 945) 
and Hayek (1 944) so much about centralized planning. However, social 
planning or the use of theory in policy-making per se is not the basic 
problem. The problem rests with the affinity of macro-theory for blunt 
instruments. 
Although enamored of macro-theory, Etzioni (I968) is nonetheless 
concerned about the blunt instrument problem. Rather than reverting to 
the atheoretical position of the hardline i-ncrementalists (Lindblom, i 965) 
he advocates various forms of a mixed-scanning approach - theoretical in 
its choice of interventions but incremental in their adjustment and 
revision. This, of course, is basically the same process of 'fine-tuning' used 
by advocates of stabilization policy to correct potential instrument errors. 
Once again, the difference lies in the relative availability of levers and 
concrete targets (Hogwood and Peters, I985). Etzioni is left with the 
problem of how to guide social processes. While he can specify the 
dynamic underlying these processes in different contexts, his choice of 
intervention points is guesswork at best. 
The difficulty faced by sociologists and economists in developing 
refined instruments from macro-policy suggests that the limitation resides 
not in the particular disciplinary approach or in the details of the theory, 
but in the nature of macro-theory itself. While one of the principal ways of 
differentiating macro from micro theories is scale - macro-theories adopt 
aggregates as their unit of analysis and focus on systems-level phenomena 
- the shortcomings of macro-policy approaches can be tied more closely to 
the implicit tradeoff between precision and inclusiveness that an increase 
in scale demands. We cultivate precision in our theories by controlling, or 
at least understanding, many of the individual sources of variation that 
macro-theories typically regard as sources of error. Unfortunately, as we 
expand our theories to be more inclusive of causal relations, values, or 
instruments, our ability to maintain precision rapidly diminishes. Main- 
taining both precision and inclusiveness is the hallmark of elegance 
among theories in the natural sciences, but is as yet too complex a task for 
the social and behavioral sciences. Levels of aggregation correspond to 
levels of acceptable error in dealing with human behavior. Thus, to a large 
extent, the transition from a micro to a macro-level explanation involves 
the implicit choice between alternative mixes of precision and inclusive- 
ness. The available set of choices is constrained by complexity. 
Consider the choice space depicted in Figure i. To develop a service- 
able design theory we need to maximize precision without sacrificing a 
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great deal of inclusiveness. This takes us to the fabled middle-range 
(Merton, I957) at the intersection of macro and micro approaches. Here 
we can find the optimal mix to satisfy each of the three dimensions of 
design theory: causality, evaluation and instruments. In the case of 
instruments, for example, not only is a broad range of different kinds of 
instruments needed, we also need precision in our mapping of instru- 
ments into problems. Imprecision, of course, means that we would likely 
have both sleeper and spillover effects, many of which might exacerbate 
the problem of concern (Goodin, 1982, 22-4). Macro-theory alone, 
despite its capacity for accommodating a greater array of causes, values 
and instruments, cannot provide the necessary precision. Moreover, as 
we will see, the inclusiveness of macro-theory generates its own, internal 
contradictions. 
FIGURE I: Tradeoffs between precision and inclusiveness 
Precision 
r2 \ Design Theories 
Teories / 
-. ;Macro Theories 
Inclusiveness 
5. Toward a theoty of evaluation 
Evaluation is widely recognized as an integral part of the policy-making 
process. It is at times a rather simple mechanical exercise of applying 
statistics to the outcomes (or presumed outcomes) of policies and asses- 
sing the extent to which the policy reached its goals (or presumed goals). 
If, however, we begin to think about evaluation in a broader theoretical 
sense, and from the perspective of policy design outlined previously, some 
important problems arise. 
The problem with making a claim to incorporate fundamental values 
(e.g. justice, fairness, equality) into any macro-policy theory is that we 
need a macro-level theory of evaluation for doing so. Ifwe disavow macro- 
theories because of their weaknesses in generating propositions about 
instruments (see below), we may have to stick with an operational theory 
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of evaluation as well. Consider Rawls' (I97I) theory. Although he has an 
elaborate macro-theory of evaluation, he has only a rudimentary theory of 
instrumentation and not much of a theory of causality. Macroeconomics, 
on the other hand, has a well-developed theory of causality, a rudimen- 
tary theory of instrumentation, but little theory justifying its normative 
premises. As a general rule, the stronger the theory of causality at the 
macro-level, the weaker the theory of evaluation and vice-versa. This is 
largely the produce of the incompatibility between the instrumental logic 
of our causal assertions and the non-instrumental nature of most of our 
societal overriding values. 
Let us consider the constituent of theoretical 'strength' most closely 
associated with macro-policy theory, inclusiveness, and reexamine this 
general rule. To aid our reexamination, as well as to illustrate our earlier 
points, we will construct a heuristic device involving the analytic 
representation of macro-theories as points in a three dimensional space. 
Each dimension will correspond to one of our three design ingredients - 
causes, values and instruments - and positions along these dimensions 
will represent degrees of inclusiveness. An example appears in Figure 2. 
As we move to the right in Figure 2, we will find theories accommodating 
increasingly greater numbers of causal variables and relationships. Mov- 
ing upward vertically signifies an increase in the array of values, and 
moving outward increases the types of instruments. From our earlier 
FIGURE 2: Three dimensions of design theoiy 
VALUES 
b 
S b~~~~ 
/ *-> : . ~~~CAUSES 
/. . . . .. . . . * .00. * ...O 
INSTRUMENTS 
Note: Dimensions are ordered according to increasing 
inclusiveness. 
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statements about inclusiveness as a definitional attribute, we can show 
macro-theories as falling some distance from the origin in this space. In 
addition, the optimal mix of precision and inclusiveness proposed earlier 
as a distinguishing feature of design theory can be represented in this 
space. Balancing the need for precision against the demands of inclusive- 
ness must take place for each of these dimensions. As a result, we would 
expect design theories to fall somewhere along the middle portion of the 
diagonal from the origin, labelled 'a'. The curve labelled 'b' in Figure 2 
illustrates the logical contradiction suggested by the general rule stated 
above. Capturing a greater number of causal relations demands an 
increasingly narrow set of values in order to refine the focus of one's 
explanations. Conversely, attention to greater numbers of values eventu- 
ally leads one beyond causal relations to consider relations of other types 
(e.g. responsibility, obligation). 
Consider the extreme example of a complex macro-policy approach 
which has highly inclusive theories of both causality and instruments. 
Macro-systems theory (Kozmetsky, 1980), the approach underlying our 
largest scale engineering projects (NASA's Project Apollo, the Jubail 
Petrochemical Complex, etc.), represents the best the design sciences have 
to offer. Its practitioners, moreover, are quite optimistic about the 
approach's applicability to policy-making: 'macro-engineering must be 
co-joined [sic] with social engineering at the macro-systems level so that 
newer institutional arrangements - economic, political, social - can be 
formed that solve today's and tomorrow's human and social needs' 
(Kozmetsky, I 980). This carries the endorsement of the American Associ- 
ation for the Advancement of Science (Davidson et al., I980). The 
advantages of this macro-systems approach over the other macro-theories 
based in social science is its capacity for reaching a higher degree of 
precision for any given level of inclusiveness. In effect, it is a theory which 
can be applied at either micro or macro levels, spanning the space shown 
in Figure i. 
However, its capacity for accomplishing this is based on the careful 
exclusion of behavioral and social phenomena. Performance is equated 
with the ability to meet certain mechanical and physical stresses within 
fiscal limits. The one caveat acknowledged by the proponents of this 
approach is the often troublesome problem of 'cultural impact'. The 
products of macro-systems design are typically large-scale projects that 
have profound socio-cultural impacts on the societies that choose to 
undertake them. Solutions of the technological and managerial aspects of 
the problem can be accomplished within the macro-theory. The issue of 
social values remains. 
Figure 3 fills in Figure 2 with examples of the four classes of theories 
introduced in the preceding sections. Macro-systems theory, while the 
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most inclusive of instruments and causal relations, is largely exclusive of 
social values. In a sense, this represents asocial engineering; thus, it is not 
the ideal prototype for policy design that some say it is. Macro-economic 
and macro-sociological theories appear at a lower level of causal and 
instrumental inclusiveness, with the latter accommodating far fewer 
instruments. Finally, the macro-philosophical theories appear higher 
than the other theories on values but lower on the remaining dimensions. 
Notice the suggestion of a pattern resembling the curve labelled 'b' in 
Figure 2. Notice as well the absence of any cases close to the diagonal 
labelled 'a'. Filling in this diagonal is one way of defining the task facing 
the developers of a theory of policy design. It is not a task which can be 
accomplished from the macro perspective alone. 
Moreover, as a practical matter, industrialized societies typically avoid 
direct dealings with fundamental values for policy purposes because of the 
potential conflicts this might create. Value-laden matters are generally 
settled through some type of mechanism which can sustain pluralistic 
competition while fashioning temporary resolutions on specific policy 
issues. The design of effective policies, then, is better served by focusing on 
the instrumental values which play a prominent role in problem recog- 
nition and definition. Instrumental values not only define desired per- 
formance at an operational level and reveal any gap left by existing 
FIGURE 3: Macro theories and design dimensions 
VALUES 
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practices, but also identify the underlying attributes of a desirable 
instrument. 
The designer's efforts should eventually yield a match between a 
generic strategy or set of instruments and a specific policy goal, but need 
go no further. Sorting out conflicts between fundamental values or 
implicitly weighting the claims of different individuals are better left to the 
decision-makers authorized to make the ultimate choice among plausible 
alternatives. The designer need only reach what the decision-maker 
considers a 'satisfactory' degree of approximation in a suggested match 
between goal and instrument. In this context, the designer's criteria are 
non-decisive, generating an agenda of plausible alternatives representa- 
tive of certain generic strategies. Restraint by the designer, resisting the 
temptation to interject certain values or artificially delimit choices, not 
only disciplines the design process but recognizes the legitimate role of 
qualitativejudgement in reaching policy decisions. 
Efforts to systematize the decision process or to represent implicit 
values in quantitative terms should remain logically distinct from the 
design process. Although one may consider the fashioning of choice 
models or mechanisms a proper design problem, it is a second-order task 
which must presume that the design of alternatives has already taken 
place. Separating the design of instruments from the eventual selection 
process does not rule out the iterative refinement of instruments until one 
converges on a single 'best' choice. Rather, we are arguing for an analytic 
division of labor which will insulate the design process from choice- 
connected biases that lead to premature closure. In sum, the evaluation of 
designs, from the building of generic strategies through the screening and 
sorting of substantive alternatives, need not employ criteria as demanding 
as those applied to choices. By emphasizing the instrumental values over 
non-instrumental ones, we can avoid the pitfall common to many evalua- 
tion methods, including cost-benefit analysis, of claiming too much in 
view of the poorly developed nature of one's theory of evaluation. 
6. Why a theory of interventions? 
One of the basic lessons of the Great Society's policy experiments during 
the I 96os is that our most pressing problems can not be solved simply by 
spending enough federal dollars (Aaron, 1978). While concern for the 
scale of policy solutions has prompted a reassessment of federal efforts in 
many policy areas, there have been only minor revisions of the solutions 
themselves (Schulman, I980). For the most familiar problems facing 
society - crime, pollution, urban blight - there is little understanding of 
the factors which contribute to a policy's eventual success or failure. 
Knowledge about which strategies work best under which conditions is at 
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best rudimentary. Yet, without this knowledge society must rely upon 
trial and error for developing the solutions to its policy problems. Under 
these circumstances, only the most familiar strategies receive attention as 
possible solutions. Strategies producing even minimal success are guaran- 
teed not only longevity but many reincarnations. For example, social 
insurance schemes, despite their fiscal limitations, have been recycled 
from their applications to problems of labor markets to health care and 
are viewed by some as holding promise for product safety problems. 
Earlier strategies, including previously discredited ones, constantly 
reappear as new solutions (Hogwood and Peters, I983, 26I-4). Hoover's 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, for example, has reemerged as a 
progressive strategy to promote economic development. 
Informed by only fragmentary evidence, the formulation of most 
strategies proceeds on an ad hoc basis. Components of other strategies 
which are presumed to be successful are incorporated in a haphazard 
fashion. Moreover, there is a tendency to choose policy instruments on the 
basis of how they work, without seriously considering how well they may 
perform given what needs to be accomplished. We routinely identify 
problems with the method used to deal with them, e.g. regulation, to the 
point of naming a problem by its corresponding method. This practice is 
especially evident in our treatment of legal remedies, but also shapes our 
view of market failures. 
Also, because of an absence of an adequate theory of interventions, 
there is a similar tendency to label problems with nominal, functional 
titles, e.g. health, education or defense. Such a labelling scheme tends to 
lump together problems requiring (probably) very different forms of 
intervention. For example, the 'health' problems of quality assurance 
probably should be treated by very different mechanisms than problems 
of cost control. Unfortunately, we do not have an adequate guide for 
choosing what methods of intervention would be most appropriate for 
either. We especially are not sure why one would be more appropriate 
than another for either problem. 
Unfortunately, defining a problem in terms of a strategy for solving it 
reinforces the bias toward favored strategies and deceptively simplifies 
the formulation process. Poor performance, then, is attributed not to the 
choice of the wrong policy instrument, but to the symptoms of poor choice 
such as waste and mismanagement. The failure of a poorly fashioned 
program is too often blamed upon the implementor, under the mistaken 
presumption that success is a product of the program's adaptability in the 
field, rather than its underlying strategy. 
The artificial separation of social science theory from the formulation of 
practical policy inhibits the application of insights from research to the 
design of concrete solutions. Apart from economics, the social sciences 
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typically resist the formulation of novel alternatives for improving policy 
(MacRae, 1976). Although acknowledging some value bias, efforts to 
combine judgements about values with empirical propositions to 
influence policy are viewed with suspicion. While economists have con- 
tributed readily to policy advice, an emphasis on one value - economic 
efficiency - over others has restricted both the variety of proposals and the 
basis of evaluation. To the extent that economic instruments are restric- 
ted to altering market incentives and changing information and owner- 
ship conditions, other disciplines have a complementary contribution to 
make. Sociology focuses attention on changing norms and organizational 
arrangements, psychology on changing preferences and beliefs, 
anthropology on changing symbols and social relations, and political 
science on changing policy processes and political institutions. The 
variety of disciplinary perspectives can expand the range of political 
instruments and the values which they serve. 
Although the design of physical forms to solve certain problems has 
long been a central focus for the applied sciences, such as engineering and 
architecture, no comparable focus on the design of solutions for public 
problems has emerged within the policy profession (but see Alexander, 
1982). The emphasis on fashioning solutions which once characterized 
the planning profession with its emphasis on social reform has given way 
to a limited focus on evaluating the short- and long-term consequences 
of alternative policies. Policy analysts, trained primarily in the social 
sciences, also deemphasize the design of solutions, preferring instead to 
concentrate on the comparison and evaluation of given alternatives. Left 
to the political process, designs emerge less as the result of creative, 
systematic effort than as a product of experiences, precedent and 
expedience. Analytic skills simply are not devoted to the formulation of 
alternatives. The professional analyst typically accepts the set of alterna- 
tives as given, the product of some advocate's entrepreneurship and of 
political compromise. The analyst's role then is not to remake the 
alternatives but to predict their impact and, to an increasing degree, to 
evaluate the prospects for enactment and trouble-free implementation. 
However, if the design of policy instruments is left to intuition, and the 
details worked out informally, the analyst's emphasis on evaluation is 
misplaced. The outcome of policy will be shaped more by the agenda of 
alternatives and the values underlying it, than by the results of the 
analyst's formal evaluation. For example, once the strategies for dealing 
with social risks are limited to various forms of direct controls on private 
activity, subsequent evaluation of the controls' performance is virtually 
irrelevant. Alternative means that might prove less costly and perhaps 
more effective have been foregone. The design and formulation of strate- 
gies must be given systematic attention if we are to overcome institutional 
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and conceptual obstacles to innovativeness in our policy solutions. At 
present, no middle-range theory for guiding the design of specific policy 
strategies exists. Without even a rudimentary theory, there is no way of 
assigning a policy instrument to a problem with any confidence of the 
outcome. Similarly, there is no direction for developing new instruments 
or adapting existing ones to different purposes. 
A focus on the design of policy instruments shifts attention from the 
evaluation of different substantive programs to a concern with the basic 
strategy implicit in each alternative. What kind of instruments, if any, 
should the government employ for a particular problem, and why? More 
importantly, how do we define an instrument as the appropriate choice for 
a particular task, and what values are at issue? Research on the design of 
policy should address these questions in the course of developing a theory 
that will accommodate familiar instruments, such as taxation and price or 
quantity controls, and suggest new ones. The instruments associated with 
the perspective of any one discipline constitute only a limited set of cases. 
The study of designs, then, should range from the legal profession's focus 
on changing entitlements or liability rules to the economist's concern with 
pricing schemes. 
Whether the problem is an architectural, mechanical or administrative 
one, the logic of design is fundamentally similar. The idea is to fashion an 
instrument that will work in a desired manner. In the context of policy 
problems, design involves both a systematic process for generating basic 
strategies and a framework for comiparing them. Examining problems 
from a design perspective offers a more productive way of organizing our 
thinking and analytical efforts. Once the set of basic instruments is 
developed, attention can be devoted to the substantive details of each 
alternative. The analyst must ensure that an appropriate range of designs 
is advanced during the formulation stages of policy-making. Systematic 
attention to design will not only enhance the performance of the alterna- 
tive eventually chosen, but also expand the opportunities for serious 
consideration of innovative strategies. 
Efforts to develop a theoretical approach to interventions should have 
several goals. The first is to adopt a coherent approach to policy problems 
which stresses the central role of design. This involves a reorientation of 
conventional policy analysis away from ex post evaluation and a preoccu- 
pation with the substantive details of particular programs to the develop- 
ment of generic strategies for solving problems. Consider the issue of 
consumer protection. While there is no general theory of regulatory 
design identifying certain strategies for consideration, we can propose a 
range of strategies, which emphasize different criteria, and then examine 
their implications. We might consider various information instruments 
(such as mandatory disclosure of consumer education), direct controls 
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(such as design or performance standards), and legal instruments 
(including liability and negligence systems). Moreover, each of these pure 
strategies might be combined with others to form hybrids and implemen- 
ted in ways that stress selected values, perhaps emphasizing equity over 
cost minimization, or discretion over accountability (Bardach and 
Kagan, I982). 
The second goal of policy design is to fill in the gaps of our knowledge 
about what might work and to broaden our view of possible strategies. In 
the process, various obstacles to innovation in policy design - disciplinary 
prejudice favoring the elaboration of causal theories, biases toward 
familiar strategies, reliance on ad hoc formulations, parochial views of 
feasibility - must be confronted (Scott and Shore, 1979; Sieber, I98I). 
Following conventional practice in the design professions, we can 
enhance the productivity of our efforts by carefully organizing both the 
search among existing strategies and our efforts to create new ones. 
Establishing a logical procedure for designing policy instruments not only 
reduces the likelihood of errors but also makes explicit the thinking that 
goes into the development of each design. Complex problems, then, can 
be reduced to manageable proportions by clarifying basic design require- 
ments and developing plausible strategies for their solution. 
7. Notes towards a theogy of design 
As we stated in section 2, policy analysis requires an understanding of 
causation, of evaluation, and of intervention. The approach to policy 
design which we have been sketching here will require at least the 
following elements to deal with the complexity of design problems in the 
complex world in which policy is now fashioned. 
7.1 Characteristics ofproblems 
Rather than dealing with policy problems in nominal categories (health, 
education, or regulation, i.e. categories bearing either the name of a 
'policy area' or of a tool), we should develop some attributes of policy 
problems which will be useful for designing interventions. These might 
include such things as: 
i. Scale. As discussed by Schulman (1 980), scale implies that some policies 
cannot be effective unless some threshold size is attained. Obviously, 
designing interventions for policies of this type will be different than for 
policies which can be managed more incrementally. 
2. Collective consumption goods. Goods of this sort have special features which 
may influence the manner in which they must be treated in the policy 
process (Benjamin, I980). 
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3. Certainty. In designing policies, we can be certain - or relatively certain 
- that some environmental changes have occurred and less certain about 
others. For example, we are quite sure that major demographic changes 
will be occurring in almost all industrialized societies. We are somewhat 
less certain of the occurrence, extent, and nature of changes in the natural 
environment. 
4. Predictability. Certain occurrences can be predicted on a 'if x, then y' 
basis. This does not appear to be the case for much of social change. As in 
the Moon and the Ghetto analogy, some seemingly difficult problems can 
be engineered more readily than others. 
5. Independence. In the contemporary post-industrial world, virtually all 
programs and policies are impacted by international forces. Even seem- 
ingly domestic issues such as social security programs may be heavily 
impacted by external events, e.g. interest rates in the international 
market. The degree of independence of a program is, however, a variable, 
and decision-makers must understand the degree to which they can, or 
cannot, determine the outcomes in a particular policy area. 
7.2 Characteristics ofgoals 
We have to understand better the nature of the goals which may be 
posited for public programs. As noted in section 2, these may be broken 
down first into the heavily value-laden goals such as justice, equity, etc., 
and the more operational goals such as the types of economic criteria used 
to justify governmental intervention into the economy (Wolf, 1979). 
Goals are among the least well-understood components of policy-making, 
and a great deal of additional work is required to be able to bring them 
into the policy design process in a more operational manner. 
As noted in section 5, the importance of goals in policy analysis also 
implies some attention to, and respect for, the nature of the process 
through which goals are set. Unlike the asocial approach to policy design 
exemplified by the macro-systems approach, an approach to policy design 
workable within the context of democratic policy-making systems will 
require some attention to both goal-setting and goal clarification through 
the political process. This does not mean, however, that the policy analyst 
and the 'policy organization' must be only reactive to goal statements 
produced elsewhere; they can and should be quite active in attempting to 
modify goals. They must, however, remember that technical solutions do 
not necessarily imply the goals that would justify them. 
At the present state of development of value theory in policy analysis, 
perhaps the best the analyst can hope for is to inject goal statements into 
the analysis in a contingent fashion. That is, the analyst may be able to tell 
the decision-maker that ifXis his or her principal goal then x should be the 
This content downloaded from 142.58.129.109 on Mon, 2 Sep 2013 05:35:53 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
256 Stephen H. Linder and B. Guy Peters 
policy adopted within the context of the range of alternatives available. It 
may well be that there may be no alternative readily available that scores 
highly on that particular goal; without the more explicit attention to goals 
and the design process the decision-maker might not be made aware of 
that weakness in the range of alternatives considered. 
7.3 Characteristics of instruments 
As noted in section 6, this will be a major component of any theory of 
policy design. Some preliminary work has already been done on this 
problem. For example, Hood (I 984) has classified the 'tools' available to 
government as NATO (nodality, authority, treasure, and organization). 
Again, a great deal more must be done to gain an understanding of the 
TABLE I: Rudimentay appraisal criteria 
Criteria Model Instrument 
I. Relevancy Does the model describe Does the instrument relate 
the policy content? directly to the policy 
problem? 
2. Distortion Is there a bias between Will the instrument cause 
the model and the distortion of other social or 
reference system? economic processes? 
3. Stuctural Is the model design based Is the instrument based on 
integrity on internally consistent internally consistent 
principles? principles? 
4. Reproducability What is the model's 'track Has the instrument been 
record' for replicating successful in similar 
historical data? situations? 
5. Tractability Is the model easily used? Is the instrument easily used? 
6. Accessibility Are the model's input and Is information available to 
output familiar and make the instrument work and 
intelligible? to monitor its effects? 
7. Flexibility Is the model design capable Can the instrument work in 
of undergoing change? a changing environment? 
8. Common sense Are the model's forecasted Does intuition tell one the 
results offensive to basic instrument should be 
intuition? effective? 
9. Credibility Is there consonance between Do those administering the 
the model-builder and the instrument believe it will 
policy-makers? be effective? 
io. Efficiency What are the costs What are the costs 
associated with operating associated with operating 
the model? the instrument? 
Adapted from Hall (1975). 
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nature, political, social and economic, of the weapons which governments 
can wield. 
One checklist which may be useful in evaluating the utility of instru- 
ments for particular settings was developed by Hall (I975) for the 
evaluation of policy models. Table i contains the ten criteria developed by 
Hall, along with the descriptors he applied for policy models and 
descriptors we have developed for policy instruments. In some of the cases 
the criteria applied to a model may not be obviously applicable to a policy 
instrument. For example, the criterion of distortion implies rather dif- 
ferent things when discussing possible bias in a computer simulation and 
the distortion which a policy instrument may cause in other elements of 
the policy environment. This checklist does, however, provide a place at 
which to begin thinking about the types of questions which must be asked 
every time governments begin to intervene, and begin to select the 
instruments they will use to intervene. In a similar vein, May (i 98I ) has 
assembled some 'hints' for crafting alternative policies. As with our 
checklist and earlier admonitions about reasoning by analogy, May 
warns against misclassifying problems and applying stock solutions to 
difficult, complex, and perhaps novel problems. All these ideas and 
approaches merely reinforce the basic premise that there is as yet very 
little in the way of a theory of instrumentation in policy design, and that 
there is a need for such a theory. Such a theory would, of course, need to 
meet the criteria of inclusiveness and precision which have been advanced 
earlier. 
8. Summary 
In summary, we have attempted in this article to lay the groundwork for a 
more theoretical approach to policy-making through a concept of policy 
design. This work is as yet rudimentary, but hopefully it will allow us to 
address the difficult problems in a way that will produce effective and 
efficient public interventions, rather than the almost random interven- 
tions which we would argue characterize much contemporary policy- 
making. We have argued that such a theory of policy design must contain 
means of including causation, evaluation and instrumentation. We have 
further argued that concentrating on such a theory of design which is 
specifically policy related will be a more efficient means of improving 
public policy-making than will be waiting for the development of more 
robust and precise macro-level social theories. 
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